

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

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| ANTHONY VERDELLO DUNKINS, |) | |
| ID # 919072, |) | |
| Petitioner, |) | |
| vs. |) | No. 3:07-CV-0324-G (BH) |
| |) | ECF |
| NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Director, |) | Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge |
| Texas Department of Criminal |) | |
| Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, |) | |
| Respondent. |) | |

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, subject cause has previously been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, an inmate currently incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID), filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge his August 12, 1999 conviction and resulting thirty-year sentence for possession of a controlled substance. (See Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus (Pet.) at 2 and attached documents.) The respondent is Nathaniel Quarterman, Director of TDCJ-CID.

In the instant petition, petitioner asserts nine grounds for relief – (1) denial of equal protection resulting from an alleged denial of the opportunity to review various state court documents; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel when his attorney failed to interview an eyewitness, Michael Lester, a Texas inmate; (3) denial of access to courts when he was denied right to correspond with witness Lester during petitioner's state post-conviction proceedings; (4) denial of right to be heard

via evidentiary hearing and affidavits during state post-conviction proceedings; (5) denial of proper presentation of issues to Court of Criminal Appeals when trial court failed to hold hearing on his timely motion for new trial; (6) flagrant prosecution caused by the prosecutor's failure to test for fingerprints; (7) trial court abused its discretion by denying hearing on motion for new trial; (8) denied an evidentiary hearing during state post-conviction proceedings; and (9) failure to obtain affidavits from counsel during state post-conviction proceedings.

Petitioner has challenged his possession conviction before in federal court by way of a § 2254 petition. See *Dunkins v. Dretke*, No. 3:01-CV-2637-H (N.D. Tex.) (Pet. received Dec. 13, 2001). In the prior action, petitioner raised seven claims: (1) his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to object to faulty evidence; an alleged defective indictment; and a response from the trial court to a jury note; (2) insufficiency of the evidence; (3) abuse of discretion by the trial court in handling the jury note; (4) jury misconduct; (5) conviction obtained through use of evidence gained through unconstitutional search and seizure; (6) invalid or defective indictment; and (7) violation of *Miranda*¹ rights. See *id.* (Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation dated July 14, 2004). On August 2, 2004, the Court denied the first petition on its merits. See *id.* (Judgment and Order dated Aug. 2, 2004).

Because petitioner has filed a previous federal petition to challenge his possession conviction, the Court must determine whether the instant petition is a second or successive application within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).

¹ *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

II. SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE APPLICATION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA) limits the circumstances under which a state prisoner may file a second or successive application for habeas relief in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b). Under Fifth Circuit precedent, “a later petition is successive when it: 1) raises a claim challenging the petitioner’s conviction or sentence that was or could have been raised in an earlier petition; or 2) otherwise constitutes an abuse of the writ.” *Crone v. Cockrell*, 324 F.3d 833, 836-37 (5th Cir. 2003); *accord United States v. Orozco-Ramirez*, 211 F.3d 862, 867 (5th Cir. 2000).² A petition that is literally second or successive, however, is not a second or successive application for purposes of AEDPA if the prior dismissal is based on prematurity or lack of exhaustion. See *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 487 (2000) (declining to construe an application as second or successive when it followed a previous dismissal due to a failure to exhaust state remedies); *Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal*, 523 U.S. 637, 643-46 (1998) (declining to construe an application as second or successive when it followed a previous dismissal due to prematurity, and noting the similarities of such dismissal to one based upon a failure to exhaust state remedies). “To hold otherwise would mean that a dismissal of a first habeas petition for technical procedural reasons would bar the prisoner from ever obtaining federal habeas review.” 523 U.S. at 645.

² Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided *Orozco-Ramirez* in the context of a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, it also found it appropriate to rely upon cases decided under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in reaching its decision. See 211 F.3d at 864 n.4. In the present context, this Court also finds it appropriate to make no distinction between cases decided under § 2255 and those under § 2254.

In this case, petitioner's previous petition was not dismissed because of any prematurity or lack of exhaustion. Under *Orozco-Ramirez* and *Crone*, petitioner was therefore required to present all available claims in his first federal petition.

"The requirement that all available claims be presented in a prisoner's first habeas petition is consistent not only with the spirit of AEDPA's restrictions on second and successive habeas petitions, but also with the preexisting abuse of the writ principle. The requirement serves the singularly salutary purpose of forcing federal habeas petitioners to think through all potential post-conviction claims and to consolidate them for a unitary presentation to the district court."

Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 870-71 (quoting *Pratt v. United States*, 129 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 1997)).

Petitioner has challenged his 1999 possession conviction in a prior federal petition. The instant federal petition is successive within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) because it raises claims that could have been raised in his initial petition. He presents no reason why he could not have raised his claims in his initial petition.

When a petition is second or successive, the petitioner must seek an order from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that authorizes this Court to consider the petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The Fifth Circuit "may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of [§ 2244(b)]." *Id.* § 2244(b)(3)(C). To present a claim in a second or successive application that was not presented in a prior application, the application must show that it is based on: (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. *Id.* § 2244(b)(2).

Before petitioner files his application in this Court, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals must determine whether the application makes the requisite *prima facie* showing. *See id.* § 2244(b)(3)(A) and (B).

The Fifth Circuit has not issued an order authorizing the district court to consider this successive application for habeas relief. Petitioner must obtain such an order before this case is filed.

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned Magistrate Judge hereby recommends that the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be **TRANSFERRED** to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit pursuant to *Henderson v. Haro*, 282 F.3d 862, 864 (5th Cir. 2002) and *In re Epps*, 127 F.3d 364, 365 (5th Cir. 1997).

SIGNED this 27th day of February, 2007.


IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT**

The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendation on all parties by mailing a copy to each of them. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file and serve written objections within ten days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendation to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusory or general objections. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation within ten days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. *Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (*en banc*).


IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE